---(
Maude-PSL, Version: [1.0] [May 15th 2015]
Copyright (c) 2015, University of Illinois
All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, 
are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, 
this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, 
this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation 
and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* Neither the name of the University of Illinois nor the names of its contributors 
may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 
specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" 
AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 
THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 
ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 
FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER 
CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, 
OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright (c) 2015. To the extent that a federal employee is an author of 
a portion of the software or a derivative work thereof, no copyright is 
claimed by the United States Government, as represented by the Secretary 
of the Navy ("GOVERNMENT") under Title 17, U.S. Code. All Other Rights Reserved.
Permission to use, copy, and modify this software and its documentation is 
hereby granted, provided that both the copyright notice and this permission 
notice appear in all copies of the software, derivative works or modified 
versions, and any portions thereof, and that both notices appear in 
supporting documentation.
GOVERNMENT ALLOWS FREE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE IN ITS "AS IS" CONDITION AND 
DISCLAIM ANY LIABILITY OF ANY KIND FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING 
FROM THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
GOVERNMENT requests users of this software to return modifications, 
improvements or extensions that they make to: 
maudenpa@chacs.nrl.navy.mil]
-or-
Naval Research Laboratory, Code 5543
4555 Overlook Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20375
---)
---(
This file contains the second stage of the translation from a Maude-PSL specification to a Maude-NPA specification. To use this code, load it into
Maude and call red T ., where T is an AC soup containing the following:
**********************
The Protocol, Intruder, and Attack sections as a term of the form:
    Specification
    {
        Protocol
        {
        ...
        }
        Intruder
        {
        ...
        }
        Attacks
        {
        ...
        }
    }
    Note the addition of the "Specification" section heading, and the brackets
    at the beginning and end of each section.
**********************
[<DEFS>] - set of user-provided definitions. <DEFS> = $noDefs if we have no 
              definitions 
**********************
[mt] - Starting Strand data for protocols.
**********************
[empty] - Starting Strand Set for the Intruder.
**********************(Optional)**********************
[mt] - Another strand data if we're rewriting a composition term (and ONLY
if we're rewriting a composition term). This should be included
at the top level (i.e. same level as the [comp] structure and 
the translate terms).

If there are any problems, then the term will be lifted up to the kind, and
somewhere in the soup will be a term prefixed by a triple dollar sign: $$$
---)

---Contains the syntax for each the following translation.
load PSL-Syntax.maude
---Following one to one and one to many modules should only be used for
---debugging.
---One to One
---load nsldb.maude
---One to many
---load nslkd.maude
---TODO: Rewrite the error message terms so that they are easier for Python to parse.
---(
    Because of weird pregularity problems when trying to make Knowledge-!=  
    [from NPA-Syntax] a subsort of Disequalities, I've had to use the operator
    $!= in the Maude code. So Python needs to convert != to $!=.
---)

fmod SECTION-SEMANTICS is
    protecting SECTION-SYNTAX .
    *************************Section*********************************
    op _ in _ : SectionName SubSection -> Bool .
    eq SN:SectionName in SN:SectionName {S:Stmts} SS:SubSection = true .
    eq SN:SectionName in SS:SubSection = false [owise] .

endfm

fmod DEFINITION-SEMANTICS is
    protecting DEFINITION-SYNTAX .
    eq D:Definition, D:Definition, DS:Definitions = 
        D:Definition, DS:Definitions .

    ---This exists because it's required by downTerm. Checks performed both by
    ---the Python and by Maude should catch any errors before ever
    ---invoking $applyDefs. So, if $errorDefs shows up, it's because of an
    ---error in my code, not the user's.
    op $errorDefs : -> MsgSet .
    op $applyDefs : MsgSet Definitions -> MsgSet .
    ---This variant of applyDefs exists at the meta level, and is where we 
    ---actually apply the definitions.
    ---The other variants all reduce to this case.
    op $applyDefs : TermList Definitions -> TermList .

    eq $applyDefs(MS:MsgSet, $noDefs) = MS:MsgSet .

    eq $applyDefs(MS:MsgSet, D:NeDefinitions) = 
        downTerm($applyDefs(upTerm(MS:MsgSet), D:NeDefinitions), $errorDefs) .

    eq $applyDefs((empty).TermList, D:Definitions) = empty .   

    ceq $applyDefs((T:Term, TL:TermList), (M1:Msg := M2:Msg, D:Definitions)) 
    = upTerm(M2:Msg), $applyDefs(TL:TermList, (M1:Msg := M2:Msg, D:Definitions))
    if downTerm(T:Term, $errorDefs) == M1:Msg .

    eq $applyDefs((V:Variable, TL:TermList), D:Definitions) 
    = V:Variable, $applyDefs(TL:TermList, D:Definitions) [owise] .

    eq $applyDefs((C:Constant, TL:TermList), D:Definitions) 
    = C:Constant, $applyDefs(TL:TermList, D:Definitions) [owise] .

    eq $applyDefs((F:Qid[TL:TermList], TL1:TermList), D:Definitions) = 
        F:Qid[$applyDefs(TL:TermList, D:Definitions)], 
        $applyDefs(TL1:TermList, D:Definitions) [owise] .

    op $applyDefs : Strand Definitions -> Strand .
    var L : SMsgList-L .
    var R : SMsgList-R .
    op $errorStrand : -> Strand .
    eq $applyDefs(S:Strand, D:Definitions) = 
        downTerm($applyDefs(upTerm(S:Strand), D:Definitions), $errorStrand) .

    eq numIterations = 100 .

    eq $makeIdem($noDefs) = $noDefs .
    eq $makeIdem((P:Msg := M:Msg, DS:Definitions)) = 
        $makeIdem(P:Msg := M:Msg, P:Msg := downTerm($applyDefs(upTerm(M:Msg), DS:Definitions), $errorDefs), DS:Definitions, 
            P:Msg := M:Msg, 0) .
    eq $makeIdem(D:Definition, D:Definition, DS:Definitions, DORIG:Definition, N:Nat) = D:Definition, $makeIdem(DS:Definitions) .
    eq $makeIdem(D:Definition, D':Definition, DS:Definitions, DORIG:Definition, numIterations) = 
        $cantMakeDefsIdempotent((DORIG:Definition, DS:Definitions), numIterations) .
    eq $makeIdem(P:Msg := M:Msg, P:Msg := M':Msg, DS:Definitions, DORIG:Definition, N:Nat) = 
        $makeIdem(P:Msg := M':Msg, P:Msg := downTerm($applyDefs(upTerm(M':Msg), DS:Definitions), $errorDefs), DS:Definitions, 
            DORIG:Definition, s(N:Nat)) [owise] .

    eq $checkWellFormed(((K:Msg, N:Nat) := T:Msg), DS:Definitions) = K:Msg := T:Msg, $checkWellFormed(DS:Definitions) .
    eq $checkWellFormed($noDefs) = $noDefs .
    ceq $checkWellFormed((DS:Definitions, DSK:[Definitions])) = $checkWellFormed(DSK:[Definitions])
        if DS:Definitions =/= $noDefs .
    eq $checkWellFormed(DSK:[Definitions]) = $$$malformedDefs($moveLineNum(DSK:[Definitions])) [owise] .

    eq $moveLineNum(((K:[Msg], N:Nat) := T:[Msg], DS:[Definitions])) = (K:[Msg] := T:[Msg] $$,$$ N:Nat) $$;;;$$
        $moveLineNum(DS:[Definitions]) . 
    eq $moveLineNum($noDefs) = $noDefs .

endfm

mod PROTOCOL-SEMANTICS is
    protecting SECTION-SEMANTICS .
    protecting DEFINITION-SEMANTICS .
    protecting PROTOCOL-SYNTAX .

    vars N LN N1 : Nat . 
    var P : Role .
    vars IN OUT : MsgSet .

    ---mb Protocol {PS:ProtStmts} : ProtocolSection .

    var DEFS : Definitions .

    ---(
    The following two rules process the input and output for each role.
    The rules are identical, except for the order in which the Input and
    Output statements appear.
    Note that these two rules create the strand for each role. Therefore,
    these rules must fire before any of the rules that populate the strands.
    ---)
    crl Specification
        {
        Protocol{
            PS1:Stmts
            In(P) = IN .[N]
            PS2:Stmts
            Out(P) = OUT .[N1] 
            PS3:Stmts
        }
        SS:SubSection
        }
        [STR:StrandData]
        [DEFS]
        =>
        Specification
        {
            Protocol
            {
                PS1:Stmts PS2:Stmts PS3:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection
        }
        [P |-> {IN} :: nil :: [(nil).SMsgList-L | nil] 
            {$applyDefs(OUT, DEFS)} & STR:StrandData] 
        [DEFS]
        if IN are variables .

    crl Specification
        {
        Protocol{
            PS1:Stmts
            Out(P) = OUT .[N]
            PS2:Stmts
            In(P) = IN .[N1] 
            PS3:Stmts
        }
        SS:SubSection
        }
        [STR:StrandData]
        [DEFS]
        =>
        Specification
        {
            Protocol
            {
                PS1:Stmts PS2:Stmts PS3:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection
        }
        [P |-> {IN} :: nil :: [(nil).SMsgList-L | nil] 
            {$applyDefs(OUT, DEFS)} & STR:StrandData] 
        [DEFS]
        if IN are variables .


    ---(
        The next few rules handle ways in which the input and output can
        fail: the input contains something other than variables, or the 
        input and output statements are missing.
        Note that these checks will be pushed to Python, except possibly
        for the check that the input is variables. That depends on what
        I manage to accomplish with the parser. I'll probably keep the variable
        checking in Maude, because that requires distinguishing between
        user-defined terms, and high level syntax, which Maude is better at
        than Python.

        However, checking if the input and output statements exist should
        be easily done in Python, regardless of the power of the parser.
    ---)
    crl Specification
        {
        Protocol{
            PS1:Stmts
            In(P) = IN .[N]
            PS2:Stmts
            Out(P) = OUT .[N1]
            PS3:Stmts 
        }
        SS:SubSection
        }
        [STR:StrandData]
        =>
        $invalidInput(P, $errorInput(IN), N) 
        Specification
        {
        Protocol{
            PS1:Stmts
            PS2:Stmts
            PS3:Stmts
        }
        SS:SubSection
        }
        [STR:StrandData]
        if not IN are variables .

    crl Specification
        {
        Protocol{
            PS1:Stmts
            Out(P) = OUT .[N]
            PS2:Stmts
            In(P) = IN .[N1]
            PS3:Stmts 
        }
        SS:SubSection

        }
        [STR:StrandData]
        $invalidInput(P, $errorInput(IN), N1) 
        =>
        Specification
        {
        Protocol{
            PS1:Stmts
            PS2:Stmts
            PS3:Stmts
        }
        SS:SubSection
        }
        [STR:StrandData]
        if not IN are variables .

    crl Specification
        {
            Protocol
            {
                PS1:Stmts
                In(P) = IN .[N]
                PS2:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection
        }
        =>
        $missingOutput(P, N)
        Specification
        {
            Protocol
            {
                PS1:Stmts
                PS2:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection
        }
           if not $out P listed in (PS1:Stmts PS2:Stmts) .

       op $out_listed in_ : Role Stmts -> Bool .
       eq $out P listed in (Out(P) = OUT .[N] SS:Stmts) = true .
       eq $out P listed in pass = false .
       eq $out P listed in (S:Stmt SS:Stmts) = $out P listed in SS:Stmts [owise] .

       ---Indicates that the first argument is missing an output statement.
       op $missingOutput : Role Nat -> [TranslationData] .

    crl [missingInput] : Specification
        {
            Protocol
            {
                PS1:Stmts
                Out(P) = OUT .[N]
                PS2:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection
        }
        =>
        $missingInput(P, N)
        Specification
        {
            Protocol
            {
                PS1:Stmts
                PS2:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection
        }
       if not $in P listed in (PS1:Stmts PS2:Stmts) .

       op $in _ listed in _ : Role Stmts -> Bool .
       eq [in1] : $in P listed in (In(P) = IN .[N] SS:Stmts) = true .
       eq [in2] : $in P listed in pass = false .
       eq [in3] : $in P listed in (S:Stmt SS:Stmts) = 
        $in P listed in SS:Stmts [owise] .

       ---Indicates that we're missing an input statement for the first argument. 
       op $missingInput : Role Nat -> [TranslationData] .

    ---An error indicating that one of the inputs was not a variable. Lifts the 
    ---entire term to the kind, so that we can check if there is an error by checking
    ---if the result sort is at the kind. If it is, we look through the output for
    ---the appropriate error.
    ---Arguments:
     ---   1. The Principal with the invalid input
     ---   2. The first invalid input.
     ---   3. The line number on which the error occured.
    op $invalidInput : Role Msg Nat -> [TranslationData] .

    ---Gives us the first input that is not a variable.
    op $errorInput : MsgSet -> Msg .
    eq $errorInput(V:Msg, IN) = if V:Msg are variables then $errorInput(IN) else V:Msg fi .

    op _are variables : MsgSet -> Bool .
    ceq (V:Msg, IN) are variables = IN are variables if UPV:Term := upTerm(V:Msg) /\ 
        UPV:Term :: Variable .
    eq emptyMsgSet are variables = true .
    ceq (V:Msg, IN) are variables = false if UPV:Term := upTerm(V:Msg) /\ 
        not UPV:Term :: Variable .

    **************************Protocol Steps***************************
    ---1 . A -> B : T |- T .[LN] where LN is the current line number.
    vars TA TB : Msg .
    vars A B : Role .
    vars INA OUTA INB OUTB : MsgSet .
    var MSA MSB : SMsgList-L .
    var FSA FSB : FreshSet .
    ---(
    The following  rule populates strands of A and B with the appropriate
    term, and extracts the fresh variables from TA.
    Observe that this rule requires both A's and B's strands to already
    exist.
    Note that the messages are to the left of |. This is
    because the message list to the left is left associative, so we can append
    messages to the end. Also, we'll need the messages to be in front of the 
    bar for the attacks anyway, so this just eases implementation of the
    attack states. We'll move the
    bars to the end when we actually build the maude module.
    ---)
    rl Specification
       {
           Protocol
            {
                N . A -> B : TA |- TB .[LN]
                S:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection
       }
       [DEFS]
       [A |-> {INA} :: FSA :: [MSA | nil]{OUTA} &
        B |-> {INB} :: FSB :: [MSB | nil]{OUTB} &
        SP:StrandData]
       =>
       Specification
       {
           Protocol
            {
                S:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection
       }
       [DEFS]
       [A |-> {INA} :: FSA, $fresh($applyDefs(TA, DEFS)) :: 
            [MSA, +($applyDefs(TA, DEFS)) | nil] {OUTA} &
        B |-> {INB} :: FSB :: [MSB, -($applyDefs(TB, DEFS)) | nil]{OUTB} &
        SP:StrandData] .


        ---(
            $fresh extracts the variables of sort fresh from the passed 
            term [note that all terms passed to this function are user-defined
            terms, which must all be a subsort of Msg].
        ---)
        op $fresh : Msg -> FreshSet .
        eq $fresh(T:Msg) = $fresh(upTerm(T:Msg), empty) .

        ---(
        The first argument represents the list of terms that need to be 
        searched through for fresh variables, while the second argument 
        accumulates any found fresh variables.
        ---)
        op $fresh : TermList TermList -> FreshSet .

        ---These three rules are the base cases: a single variable, or a 
        ---single constant.
        ceq $fresh(T:Variable, TL:TermList) = $downFresh((T:Variable, TL:TermList)) 
        if getType(T:Variable) == 'Fresh .
        ceq $fresh(T:Variable, TL:TermList) = $downFresh(TL:TermList) 
        if getType(T:Variable) =/= 'Fresh .
        eq $fresh(T:Constant, TL:TermList) = $downFresh(TL:TermList) .

        ---The first equation deals with the case where the termlist to
        ---be checked for Fresh variables contains a single term of the
        ---form f(t_1, t_2, ..., t_n) (which is not a base case, because we 
        ---need to check t_1, t_2, ..., t_n).
        eq $fresh(F:Qid[TL:TermList], TL1:TermList) = 
           $fresh(TL:TermList, TL1:TermList) .
        eq $fresh((F:Qid[TL:TermList], TL2:TermList), TL1:TermList) = 
           $fresh((TL:TermList, TL2:TermList), TL1:TermList) .

        ceq $fresh((T:Variable, TL:TermList), TL1:TermList) = 
           $fresh(TL:TermList, (T:Variable, TL1:TermList)) 
           if getType(T:Variable) == 'Fresh /\ TL:TermList =/= empty .
        ceq $fresh((T:Variable, TL:TermList), TL1:TermList) = 
           $fresh(TL:TermList, TL1:TermList) 
           if getType(T:Variable) =/= 'Fresh /\ TL:TermList =/= empty .
        ceq $fresh((T:Constant, TL:TermList), TL1:TermList) = 
            $fresh(TL:TermList, TL1:TermList) 
            if TL:TermList =/= empty .

        ---(
            Given a list of terms representing variables of sort Fresh, 
            calls downterm on each variable, allowing us to then add them 
            to a role's strand.
        ---)
        op $downFresh : TermList -> FreshSet .
        ---This should never appear in the output, even if the user writes
        ---something incorrectly.
        op $error : -> Fresh .
        eq $downFresh((T:Variable, TL:TermList)) = downTerm(T:Variable, $error), 
            $downFresh(TL:TermList) .
        eq $downFresh(empty) = nil .

        eq F:Fresh, F:Fresh, FS:FreshSet = F:Fresh, FS:FreshSet .

endm

mod INTRUDER-SEMANTICS is
    protecting INTRUDER-SYNTAX .
    protecting SECTION-SEMANTICS .
    protecting PROTOCOL-SEMANTICS .

    var DEFS : Definitions .

    ---mb Intruder {IS:IntStmts} : IntruderSection .

    ---(
        Syntactic desugaring. The standard form of an intruder rule is
        MS => M where MS is a [possibly empty] set of messages, and M is a 
        single message.
        These equations put every intruder capability into that form.
    ---)
    eq => MS:MsgSet .[N:Nat] = emptyMsgSet => MS:MsgSet .[N:Nat] .
    eq MS:MsgSet => M:Msg, M1:Msg, MS1:MsgSet .[N:Nat] 
       = 
       MS:MsgSet => M:Msg .[N:Nat] 
       MS:MsgSet => M1:Msg, MS1:MsgSet .[N:Nat] .
    eq MS:MsgSet => emptyMsgSet .[N:Nat] = pass . 
    eq MS1:MsgSet <=> MS2:MsgSet .[N:Nat] = (MS1:MsgSet => MS2:MsgSet .[N:Nat]
                                             MS2:MsgSet => MS1:MsgSet .[N:Nat]) . 

    ---(
        Generates the intruder strand from a single intruder capability. 
        The function signedList constructs a list of signed messages in 
        the structure demanded by a strand [a strand's structure is a bit
        more complicated than you would expect, because the use of narrowing
        keeps us from making the list of messages in a strand associative].
    ---)
    rl [IntruderConversion] :
        Specification
        {
            Intruder
            {
                MS:MsgSet => M:Msg .[N:Nat]
                IS:Stmts
            }
            SS:SubSection 
        }
        [SS:StrandSet]
        [DEFS]
        =>
        [DEFS]
        [:: $fresh(M:Msg) :: 
            [ (nil).SMsgList-L | $signedList($applyDefs(MS:MsgSet, DEFS), 
                $applyDefs(M:Msg, DEFS))] & SS:StrandSet]
        Specification
        {
            Intruder{ IS:Stmts }
            SS:SubSection
        } .

        ---(
        Given a set of messages, m_1, m_2, ..., m_n and a single message, m,
        returns a signed list of messages: -[m_1], -[m_2], ..., -[m_n], +[m].
        Note this function is technically not a function, because the same
        set can generate different functions depending on the order in which
        elements are removed from the set. However, the order of received
        messages does not matter for intruder strands, so this nondeterminism 
        doesn't affect the semantics of the specification.

        Note that a SMsgList-R list is considered right associative for parsing
        purposes, meaning you can only extract and append messages from the 
        front of the list, not the back.
        ---)
        op $signedList : MsgSet Msg -> SMsgList-R .
        op $signedList : MsgSet SMsgList-R -> SMsgList-R .
        eq $signedList(MS:MsgSet, M:Msg) = $signedList(MS:MsgSet, (+(M:Msg), nil)) .
        eq $signedList((M:Msg, MS:MsgSet), SMR:SMsgList-R) =
            $signedList(MS:MsgSet, (-(M:Msg), SMR:SMsgList-R)) .
        eq $signedList(emptyMsgSet, SMR:SMsgList-R) = SMR:SMsgList-R .

    eq S:Strand & S:Strand = S:Strand .

    eq Specification{Intruder{pass} SS:SubSection} = 
        Specification{$emptyIntruder SS:SubSection} .

endm


mod ATTACK-SEMANTICS is
    protecting SECTION-SEMANTICS .
    protecting META-TERM .
    protecting ATTACK-SYNTAX .
    protecting PROTOCOL-SEMANTICS .

    var P : Role .

    ---This equation builds the set of attack data that the translation
    ---rules depended on. By waiting until the Protocol section has been
    ---translated before creating the empty set of attack data, we can
    ---guarantee that the Attack section won't be processed, until the 
    ---Protocol section has been fully translated.
    eq Specification { Protocol { pass } SS:SubSection } = 
        [$emptyAttackData] Specification { $emptyProtocol SS:SubSection }  .

            
    var DEFS : Definitions .
    var N : Nat .

    ---(
    Builds attacks that have at least one without block.
    The variable declarations in brackets are actually terms that allow us to 
    add variables to the attack states, without forcing the user to provide
    to the original term to be translated.
    These declarations will be added to the Maude module when constructing
    the module.
    ---)
    rl [translateAttacksWithNeverPattern] :
    Specification
    {
        Attacks{
            N .{CA:CoreAttack WA:WithoutBlocks}
            A:Stmts
        }
        SS:SubSection 
    }
    [DEFS]
    [SP:StrandData]
    [AT:AttackData]
    =>
    [DEFS]
    [SP:StrandData]
    Specification {Attacks{ A:Stmts} SS:SubSection}
    [var S : StrandSet .] 
    [var K : IntruderKnowledge .]
    [var LIST : SMsgList-R .]
    [ AT:AttackData
        [N:Nat |-> $genAttackStrands(CA:CoreAttack, $subst(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS),  SP:StrandData, DEFS)
               ||  $genIntruderKnowledge(CA:CoreAttack, $subst(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS), DEFS)
               ||  nil
               ||  nil
               ||  never($genNeverPatterns(WA:WithoutBlocks, SP:StrandData, DEFS))]] .
    

---(
Builds attacks that don't have any without blocks. Other than the processing
of without blocks, this and the previous rule are identical.
---)
rl [translateAttackWithoutNever] :
    Specification
    {
        Attacks{
            N .{CA:CoreAttack}
            A:Stmts
        }
        SS:SubSection 
    }
    [SP:StrandData]
    [DEFS]
    [AT:AttackData]
    =>
    [var S : StrandSet .] 
    [var K : IntruderKnowledge .]
    [var LIST : SMsgList-R .]
    [SP:StrandData]
    [DEFS]
    Specification {Attacks{A:Stmts} SS:SubSection}
    [AT:AttackData 
        [N:Nat |->    $genAttackStrands(CA:CoreAttack, $subst(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS), SP:StrandData, DEFS)
               || $genIntruderKnowledge(CA:CoreAttack, $subst(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS), DEFS)
               || nil
               || nil
               || nil]] .

    eq [V:VarDecl] [V:VarDecl] = [V:VarDecl] .

    ---(
    Given a set of core attack statements (intruder knowledge, execution
    statements, substitutions, and constraints), a substitution, the set of
    strands computed while translating the Protocol section, and the user-defined
    definitions, returns a set of strands [instantiated by the second argument]
    that correspond to the execution statements in the first argument.
    So if we have the following execution statements:
    A executes protocol .
    B executes protocol .
    and the substitution theta, then
    we get the set of strands 
    s_A\theta & s_B\theta
    where s_A is A's strand, and s_B is B's strand.
    ---)
    op $genAttackStrands : CoreAttack Mappings StrandData Definitions ~> StrandSet .
    vars IN OUT : MsgSet .
    eq $genAttackStrands(R:Role executes protocol .[N] CA:CoreAttack, 
        M:Mappings, R:Role |-> {IN}S:Strand{OUT} & SD:StrandData, DEFS)
    = 
      $applyMapping($applyDefs(S:Strand, DEFS), M:Mappings) &  
       $genAttackStrands(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, SD:StrandData, DEFS) .

    eq $genAttackStrands(R:Role executes up to N1:Nat .[N] CA:CoreAttack,
        M:Mappings, R:Role |-> {IN}S:Strand{OUT} & SD:StrandData, DEFS)
    =
        $applyMapping($applyDefs($prefix(S:Strand, N1:Nat), DEFS), M:Mappings) &
        $genAttackStrands(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, SD:StrandData, DEFS) .

    ceq $genAttackStrands(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, SD:StrandData, DEFS) = empty 
    if  not $hasExecutionStmt(CA:CoreAttack) .

    eq $genAttackStrands(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, SD:StrandData, DEFS) = empty [owise] .


    op $hasExecutionStmt : CoreAttack -> Bool .
    eq $hasExecutionStmt(R:Role executes protocol .[N] CA:CoreAttack) = true .
    eq $hasExecutionStmt(R:Role executes up to N1:Nat . [N] CA:CoreAttack) = true .
    eq $hasExecutionStmt(CA:CoreAttack) = false [owise] .
        

    ---(
        Given a Strand, :: r1 :: [m_1, m_2, ..., m_l] and a natural number
        n < l, returns a prefix of the strand of the form:
            :: r1 :: [m_1, m_2, ..., m_n | L] where L is a variable 
            representing a list of signed messages.
    ---)
    op $prefix : Strand Nat -> Strand .
    op $prefixList : SMsgList-L Nat -> SMsgList-L .
    eq $prefix(:: r1:FreshSet :: [L:SMsgList-L | nil], N) = :: r1:FreshSet :: [$prefixList(L:SMsgList-L, N) | LIST] .

    ---All of this "makeAssoc" and "makeRightAssoc" is necessary because
    ---strand lists aren't associative (because associative lists have 
    ---infinitary unification algorithms). In fact, an SMsgList-L is 
    ---considered left associative, meaning that you can only pluck 
    ---messages off the end. Not exactly useful when you need the FIRST 
    ---n messages in the list.
    eq $prefixList(L:SMsgList-L, N:Nat) = $makeLeftAssoc($prefix($makeAssoc(L:SMsgList-L), N:Nat)) .

        
    sort $SMsgList .
    subsort SMsg < $SMsgList .
    op $makeAssoc : SMsgList-L -> $SMsgList .
    op _$;$_ : SMsg SMsg -> $SMsgList [assoc id: $nil] .
    op $nil : -> $SMsgList .
    eq $makeAssoc((L:SMsgList-L, M:SMsg)) = $makeAssoc(L:SMsgList-L) $;$ M:SMsg .
    eq $makeAssoc(nil) = $nil .

    op $prefix : $SMsgList Nat -> $SMsgList .
    eq $prefix(M:SMsg $;$ L:$SMsgList, s(N)) = M:SMsg $;$ $prefix(L:$SMsgList, N) .
    eq $prefix(L:SMsgList, 0) = $nil .

    op $makeLeftAssoc : $SMsgList -> SMsgList-L .
    eq $makeLeftAssoc(L:$SMsgList $;$ M:SMsg) = 
        $makeLeftAssoc(L:$SMsgList), M:SMsg .
    eq $makeLeftAssoc($nil) = nil .  

    vars N1 N2 N3 N4 : Nat .

    ---(
    Given a set of core attack statements, and a set of definitions, returns
    an idempotent substitution that has been built from the substitution 
    statements in 
    argument 1, and has had the definitions applied to its range. 

    Third argument is the list of line numbers on which the first substitution appears.

    This function, also checks to make sure that the generated substitution
    is a valid order-sorted substitution.
    ---)
    op $subst : CoreAttack Definitions -> Mapping .
    eq $subst(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS) = $makeIdem($isValid($extractMappings(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS)), 
        $mappingLineNums(CA:CoreAttack)) .

    ---(
    Given a set of core attack statements, extracts all of the substitution
    statements Subst(A) = v_1 |-> t_1, v_2 |-> t_2, ... , v_m |-> t_m .[n], and
    constructs a set of mappings
    v_1 |-> ${t_1 ; n}$, v_2 |-> ${t_2 ; n}$, ... , v_m |-> ${t_m ; v_m}$ that
    associates to each range message t_i the line on which v_i |-> t_i is
    defined. This information will be needed when printing error messages
    about poorly formed substitutions.
    ---)
    op $extractMappings : CoreAttack Definitions -> MsgPairs .
    
    eq $extractMappings(Subst(R:Role) = M:Mappings .[N] CA:CoreAttack, DEFS) = 
        $buildMsgPairs(M:Mappings, N, DEFS) $extractMappings(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS) .
    eq $extractMappings(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS) = $none [owise] .

    ---(
    Given a core attack, returns the list of line numbers on which the substitutions appear.
    ---)
    op $mappingLineNums : CoreAttack -> MyNatList .
    eq $mappingLineNums(Subst(R:Role) = M:Mappings .[N] CA:CoreAttack) = N : $mappingLineNums(CA:CoreAttack) .
    eq $mappingLineNums(CA:CoreAttack) = mt [owise] .


    ---(
    Given a set of mappings, a natural number representing the line number on
    which the mappings were defined, and the user-defined definitions, this
    function appends the passed line number to the range of each mapping, 
    encoding the line number on which that particular pair was declared. It
    also applies the definitions to the range of each pair.
    ---)
    op $buildMsgPairs : Mappings Nat Definitions -> MsgPairs .
    eq $buildMsgPairs((M:Msg |-> M1:Msg, MS:Mappings), N:Nat, DEFS) = 
        M:Msg |-> ${$applyDefs(M1:Msg, DEFS) ; N:Nat}$ $buildMsgPairs(MS:Mappings, N:Nat, DEFS) .
    eq $buildMsgPairs(M:Msg |-> M1:Msg, N:Nat, DEFS) = M:Msg |-> ${$applyDefs(M1:Msg, DEFS) ; N:Nat}$ .
    eq $buildMsgPairs(id, N:Nat, DEFS) = $none .

    var L : MyNatList .
  
    ---(
    First argument is the list of mappings to be validated. Note that the line numbers are already encoded inside the MsgPairs, so
    we don't need to separately track the line numbers.
    ---)
    op $isValid : MsgPairs -> Mappings .
    eq $isValid(M:MsgPairs) = $checkSorts($isFunction(M:MsgPairs))  .

    ---(
    Line numbers are already encoded in the $$$notAFunction error term, so we don't need to encode them separately.
    ---)
    op $isFunction : MsgPairs -> MsgPairs .
    eq $isFunction(M:Msg |-> ${M1:Msg ; N1:Nat}$ M:Msg |-> ${M2:Msg ; N2:Nat}$ 
        MS:MsgPairs) 
    = 
        if M1:Msg == M2:Msg 
        then 
            $isFunction(M:Msg |-> ${M1:Msg ; N1:Nat}$ MS:MsgPairs) 
        else
            $$$notAFunction(M:Msg |-> ${M1:Msg ; N1:Nat}$ ${M2:Msg ; N2:Nat}$
                $isFunction(M:Msg |-> ${M1:Msg ; N1:Nat}$ MS:MsgPairs)) 
        fi .
    eq $isFunction(MS:MsgPairs) = MS:MsgPairs [owise] .
    
    ---We only care about those mappings that have more than mapping. Anything
    ---with a single result term is not ambiguous, and is left over from how
    ---we implemented $isFunction.
    eq $$$notAFunction(M:Msg |-> ${M1:Msg ; N1:Nat}$ MS:[MsgPairs]) =
        $$$notAFunction(MS:[MsgPairs]) .
    eq $$$notAFunction($$$notAFunction(MS1:[MsgPairs]) MS2:[MsgPairs]) = 
        $$$notAFunction(MS1:[MsgPairs] $$$;;;$$$ MS2:[MsgPairs]) .
    eq $$$notAFunction(M:Msg |-> MN1:MsgNumSet M:Msg |-> MN2:MsgNumSet 
        MS:[MsgPairs]) 
    =
        $$$notAFunction(M:Msg |-> MN1:MsgNumSet MN2:MsgNumSet $$$;;;$$$ 
            MS:[MsgPairs]) .
        
        
    
    ---Checks to make sure each mapping is a valid order-sorted substitution.
    op $checkSorts : MsgPairs -> Mappings .
    eq $checkSorts(M:Msg |-> ${M1:Msg ; N}$ MS:MsgPairs) = 
        $isValidPair(M:Msg, M1:Msg, N), $checkSorts(MS:MsgPairs) .

    eq $checkSorts($none) = id .

    ---Checks if the sort of the first argument is a supersort of the sort of
    ---the second argument.
    op $isValidPair : Msg Msg Nat -> Mapping .
    ceq $isValidPair(D:Msg, R:Msg, N) = 
        if sortLeq(META-MOD:Module, getType(metaReduce(META-MOD:Module, upTerm(R:Msg))), getType(metaReduce(META-MOD:Module, upTerm(D:Msg))))
        then
            D:Msg |-> R:Msg
        else
            $$$invalidSorting(D:Msg |-> ${R:Msg ; N}$)
        fi 
    if META-MOD:Module := upModule('PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-SYMBOLS, false) .

    ---Given a mapping, returns the idempotent version, by applying the
    ---mapping to itself until we reach a fixed point.
    ---Second argument is the line number on which the mapping appears
    op $makeIdem : Mappings MyNatList -> Mappings .      
    eq $makeIdem(id, L) = id .
    eq $makeIdem(M:Mappings, L) = $makeIdem(M:Mappings, M:Mappings, false, 0, L) [owise] .

    ---First argument is the original mapping
    ---Second argument is the partially idempotenized mapping
    ---Third argument is how many times we've applied the original mapping
    ---to the idempotenized mapping.
    ---Fourth argument indicates whether or not we've reached the fixpoint.
    ---Fifth argument is the list of line numbers on which the substituions that make up the mapping appear.
    ---Result is the idempotenized mapping.
    op $makeIdem : Mappings Mappings Bool Nat MyNatList -> Mappings .
    eq $makeIdem(M:Mappings, M1:Mappings, true, N, L:MyNatList) = M1:Mappings .
    eq $makeIdem(M:Mappings, M1:Mappings, false, 101, L:MyNatList) = 
        $$$infiniteIdem(M:Mappings, L:MyNatList) .
    ceq $makeIdem(M:Mappings, M1:Mappings, false, N:Nat, L:MyNatList) = 
        $makeIdem(M:Mappings, M2:Mappings, M1:Mappings == M2:Mappings, s(N:Nat), L:MyNatList)
    if  M2:Mappings := $applyMapping(M:Mappings, M1:Mappings) /\ N:Nat < 101 .

---(
    op _===_ : Mappings Mappings -> Bool .
    eq M:Mappings === M:Mappings = true .
    eq M:Mappings === M1:Mappings = false [owise] .
---)
    ---Applies the first mapping to the range of the second mapping, and
    ---returns the resultant mapping.
    op $applyMapping : Mappings Mappings -> Mappings .
    op $msgError : -> [Msg] .
    eq $applyMapping(M2:Mappings, (N:Msg |-> N1:Msg, M:Mappings)) = 
        N:Msg |-> downTerm($applyMapping1(upTerm(N1:Msg), M2:Mappings), $msgError), 
        $applyMapping(M2:Mappings, M:Mappings) .
    ---Here we are treating id as the base case of the recursion, not as 
    ---an empty substitution. Technically, idM should be M, not id. However,
    ---the equation $applyMapping(M, id) = M would have the effect of copying
    ---M into the composed substitution, which is most definitely not what
    ---we want, because this would end up duplicating some mappings, and
    ---creating ambiguity for others.
    eq $applyMapping(M:Mappings, id) = id .

    ---If we go too many iterations of self-application without hitting
    ---idempotency, then this error gets added to the TranslationData pool.
    op $$$infiniteIdem : Mappings MyNatList -> [Mappings] .

    ---op $$$missingSubstitution : MsgSet Mappings Nat -> [Strand] .   

    ---(
    The following are a group of very messy functions that instantiate the 
    passed strand with the passed mapping. 

    Here be dragons. 
    ---)
    op $applyMapping : Strand Mappings ~> Strand .
    eq $applyMapping(S:Strand, id) = S:Strand .
    eq $applyMapping(S:Strand, M:Mappings) = 
        $applyMapping(upTerm(S:Strand), M:Mappings) [owise] .

    op $applyMapping : Term Mappings ~> Strand .
    op $error : Term -> Strand .
    eq $applyMapping(T:Term, id) = downTerm(T:Term, $error(T:Term)) [print "Strand meta: " T:Term] .
    eq $applyMapping('::_::`[_|_`][F:Term, ML:Term, 'nil.SMsgList-R], M:Mappings) =
        downTerm('::_::`[_|_`][F:Term, $applyMapping1(ML:Term, M:Mappings), 
            'nil.SMsgList-R], 
            $error('::_::`[_|_`][F:Term, $applyMapping1(ML:Term, M:Mappings), 
            'nil.SMsgList-R])) [owise print "Strand meta term list: " ML:Term] .
    ---Applies if we're using the "up to" syntax, in which case the last 
    ---term in the list is a constant (which Maude-NPA will treat as a variable) 
    ---of sort LIST, NOT nil. 
    eq $applyMapping('::_::`[_|_`][F:Term, ML:Term, 'LIST.SMsgList-R], M:Mappings) =
        downTerm('::_::`[_|_`][F:Term, $applyMapping1(ML:Term, M:Mappings), 
            'LIST.SMsgList-R], 
            $error('::_::`[_|_`][F:Term, $applyMapping1(ML:Term, M:Mappings), 
            'LIST.SMsgList-R])) [owise print "Strand meta term list: " ML:Term] .

    op $applyMapping1 : TermList Mappings ~> TermList .
    var M : Mappings .
    var T : Term .
    var TL TL1 : TermList .
    var F : Qid .
    vars M1 M2 : Msg .
    op $error : -> Msg .
    var T1 : Term .
    eq $applyMapping1(TL:TermList, id) = TL:TermList .
    ceq $applyMapping1((T, TL), (M1 |-> M2, M)) = T1, 
        $applyMapping1(TL, (M1 |-> M2, M)) 
    if downTerm(T, $error) == M1 /\ 
       T1 := upTerm(M2) /\ 
       M3:Msg := downTerm(T, $error) [print "Downterm: " M3:Msg] .
    eq $applyMapping1((F[TL], TL1), M) = 
        F[$applyMapping1(TL, M)], $applyMapping1(TL1, M) [owise] .
    eq $applyMapping1((C:Constant, TL), M) = 
        C:Constant, $applyMapping1(TL, M) [owise] .
    eq $applyMapping1((V:Variable, TL), M) = 
        V:Variable, $applyMapping1(TL, M) [owise] .
    eq $applyMapping1(empty, M) = empty .

    op $applyDefs : Mappings Definitions -> Mappings .
    eq $applyDefs(M:Mappings, $noDefs) = M:Mappings .
    eq $applyDefs(id, D:Definitions) = id .
    eq $applyDefs((M1:Msg |-> M2:Msg, MP:Mappings), D:NeDefinitions) = 
        $applyDefs(M1:Msg, D:NeDefinitions) |-> $applyDefs(M2:Msg, D:NeDefinitions), 
        $applyDefs(MP:Mappings, D:NeDefinitions) .
    eq $applyDefs(M1:Msg |-> M2:Msg, D:NeDefinitions) = 
        $applyDefs(M1:Msg, D:NeDefinitions) |-> $applyDefs(M2:Msg, D:NeDefinitions) .

    ---(
    Given a set of core attack statements, a set of mappings, and a set of 
    definitions, returns a sequence of disequality constraints and inI 
    statements to use as an attack's intruder knowledge.
    ---)
    op $genIntruderKnowledge : CoreAttack Mappings Definitions -> IntruderKnowledge .
    eq $genIntruderKnowledge((Intruder learns MS:MsgSet .[N]) CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, DEFS)
    =
        $msgSetToInI($applyMapping($applyDefs(MS:MsgSet, DEFS), M:Mappings)),
        $genIntruderKnowledge(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, DEFS) .

    eq $genIntruderKnowledge(With constraints I:Disequalities .[N] CA:CoreAttack,
        M:Mappings, DEFS)
    =
       $ineqToKnow-!=($applyMapping($applyDefs(I:Disequalities, DEFS), M:Mappings)),
       $genIntruderKnowledge(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, DEFS) .
    eq $genIntruderKnowledge(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, DEFS) = empty .

    ---(
    Converts disequalities into disequalities in Maude-NPA. We don't use
    IntruderKnowledge-!= directly because of issues with pre-regularity and
    garbage and stuff. I are eloquent!
    ---)
    op $ineqToKnow-!= : Disequalities -> IntruderKnowledge-!= .

    eq $ineqToKnow-!=(M1:Msg $!= M2:Msg, I:Disequalities) = M1:Msg != M2:Msg, $ineqToKnow-!=(I:Disequalities) .
    eq $ineqToKnow-!=($noIneq) = empty .

    op $applyMapping : Disequalities Mappings -> Disequalities .
    eq $applyMapping((M1:Msg $!= M2:Msg, I:Disequalities), M:Mappings) 
    = 
        $applyMapping(M1:Msg, M:Mappings) $!= $applyMapping(M2:Msg, M:Mappings), 
        $applyMapping(I:Disequalities, M:Mappings) .
    eq $applyMapping($noIneq, M:Mappings) = $noIneq .

        

    op $applyDefs : Disequalities Definitions -> Disequalities .
    eq $applyDefs((M1:Msg $!= M2:Msg, I:Disequalities), D:Definitions) = 
        $msgToDisEq($applyDefs($disEqToMsg(M1:Msg $!= M2:Msg), D:Definitions)),
        $applyDefs(I:Disequalities, D:Definitions) .

    eq $applyDefs(M1:Msg $!= M2:Msg, D:Definitions) = 
        $msgToDisEq($applyDefs($disEqToMsg(M1:Msg $!= M2:Msg), D:Definitions)) .

    ---(
    Converts a set of disequalities to MsgSets, which allows us to use the 
    applyDefs defined for sets of messages.

    Note that I could have defined an applyDefs function that actually
    handled disequalities directly instead of defining the following two
    (partial) functions, but I'm a lazy bum.
    ---)
    op $disEqToMsg : Disequality -> MsgSet .
    eq $disEqToMsg(M1:Msg $!= M2:Msg) = M1:Msg, M2:Msg .

    ---(
    Converts a pair of messages into a Disequality. Note that this operator
    is only defined for message sets of size 2. This partial function is 
    invoked after we've finished applying definitions to the messages in the
    Disequality.
    ---)
    op $msgToDisEq : MsgSet ~> Disequality .
    eq $msgToDisEq((M1:Msg, M2:Msg)) = M1:Msg $!= M2:Msg .

    ---(
    Pretty sure this was implemented as part of instantiating the inI 
    statements (which started out as a set of messages), and we're leveraging
    it for the Disequalities as well.
    ---)
    op $applyMapping : MsgSet Mappings ~> MsgSet .
    op $errorMsgSet : -> MsgSet .
    eq $applyMapping(MS:MsgSet, MP:Mappings) = 
        downTerm($applyMapping1(upTerm(MS:MsgSet), MP:Mappings), $errorMsgSet) .

    op $msgSetToInI : MsgSet -> IntruderKnowledge .
    eq $msgSetToInI((M:Msg, MS:MsgSet)) = M:Msg inI, $msgSetToInI(MS:MsgSet) .
    eq $msgSetToInI(emptyMsgSet) = empty .

    ---(
        &&&
        Given a set of without blocks, the strand data computed by processing
        the Protocol section, and a set of user-provided definitions, generates
        a set of never patterns.
    ---)
    op $genNeverPatterns : WithoutBlocks StrandData Definitions ~> NeverPatternSet .
    eq $genNeverPatterns(without: CA:CoreAttack WB:WithoutBlocks,
        SD:StrandData, DEFS)
    =
       $neverPattern(CA:CoreAttack, $subst(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS), SD:StrandData, DEFS)
       $genNeverPatterns(WB:WithoutBlocks, SD:StrandData, DEFS) .
    eq $genNeverPatterns(without: CA:CoreAttack, SD:StrandData, DEFS)
    =
       $neverPattern(CA:CoreAttack, $subst(CA:CoreAttack, DEFS), SD:StrandData, DEFS) .

    ---(
        Given a core attack (hopefully extracted from a without block), a 
        substitution, the strand data computed from the Protocol section, and
        the user provided definitions, returns a never pattern.
    ---)
    op $neverPattern : CoreAttack Mappings StrandData Definitions ~> NeverPattern  .
    eq $neverPattern(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, SD:StrandData, DEFS) 
    =
       $genAttackStrands(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, SD:StrandData, DEFS) & S
       || $genIntruderKnowledge(CA:CoreAttack, M:Mappings, DEFS), K .

    ---This is used to indicate that we can begin converting the parsed data into
    ---the Maude-NPA modules.
    eq Specification{Attacks{pass} SS:SubSection} = 
        Specification{$emptyAttacks SS:SubSection} .

endm

mod SPECIFICATION-SEMANTICS is
    protecting SECTION-SEMANTICS .
    protecting PROTOCOL-SEMANTICS .
    protecting INTRUDER-SEMANTICS .
    protecting ATTACK-SEMANTICS .
endm

mod PSL-SEMANTICS is
    protecting PSL-SYNTAX .
    protecting SPECIFICATION-SEMANTICS .
endm

---Translates the Translated Data into a Maude-NPA module .
fmod TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA-HELPER-FUNCTIONS-SEMANTICS is
    protecting TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA-SYNTAX .

    ---(
        Transforms Strand Data into sets of strand suitable for use as
        a protocol specification.
    ---)
    op convert : StrandData -> StrandSet .

    eq convert(A:Role |-> {IN:MsgSet} S:Strand {OUT:MsgSet} & SP:StrandData)
        = shiftBarLeft(S:Strand) & convert(SP:StrandData) .
    eq convert(mt) = empty .

    eq shiftBarLeft(:: F:FreshSet :: [L:SMsgList-L, M:SMsg | R:SMsgList-R ]) = 
        shiftBarLeft(:: F:FreshSet :: [L:SMsgList-L | M:SMsg, R:SMsgList-R]) .
    eq shiftBarLeft(:: F:FreshSet :: [nil | R:SMsgList-R]) = 
        :: F:FreshSet :: [nil | R:SMsgList-R] .

    eq shiftBarLeft(:: F:FreshSet :: [L:SMsgList-L, S:Synchro | R:SMsgList-R ]) =
        shiftBarLeft(:: F:FreshSet :: [L:SMsgList-L | S:Synchro, R:SMsgList-R]) .

    ---(
    Converts translated attack data into a list of attack states.
    ---)
    op convert : AttackData -> AttackList .
    eq convert([N:Nat |-> A:System] AD:AttackData) = 
        (eq ATTACK-STATE(N:Nat) = A:System [nonexec] .) 
        convert(AD:AttackData) .
    eq convert($emptyAttackData) = $emptyAttackList .

    ---Once we've finished building the Maude-NPA module, we eliminate 
    ---everything else. Including YOUR FACE!!!! 
    ops D-X NOTHING! : -> TranslationData .
    eq D-X = NOTHING! .
    
    ceq M:ModuleNPA TD:TranslationData = M:ModuleNPA 
    if TD:TranslationData =/= mt .
        
endfm



mod TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA is 
    protecting PSL-SEMANTICS .
    protecting TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA-HELPER-FUNCTIONS-SEMANTICS .
    protecting TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA-SYNTAX .

    ---(
    Wraps all the variable declarations that need to be part of the 
    Maude-NPA module inside a single operator, for ease of access 
    later.
    ---)
    op $varList : VarDecls -> TranslationData .

    eq Specification{$emptyProtocol $emptyIntruder $emptyAttacks} 
    = $translate $varList($emptyAttackList) .

    eq [V:VarDecl] $varList($emptyAttackList) = $varList(V:VarDecl) .
    eq [V:VarDecl] $varList(VL:VarDecls) = $varList(V:VarDecl VL:VarDecls) . 

    eq $varList(B:VarDecls V:VarDecl M:VarDecls V:VarDecls E:VarDecls) = $varList(B:VarDecls V:VarDecl M:VarDecls E:VarDecls) .
    eq $varList(B:VarDecls V:VarDecl M:VarDecls V:VarDecls) = $varList(B:VarDecls V:VarDecl M:VarDecls) .
        
    ---The presence of the $translate constant (added by the equation above) 
    ---ensures that we don't try to construct the Maude-NPA module until
    ---the PSL specification has been fully translated.
    rl [TranslationDataToMaudeNPASyntax] : 
        $translate [SP:StrandData] [SS:StrandSet] 
        $varList(V:VarDecls) 
        [[N:Nat |-> S:System] AT:AttackData]
    =>
    (fmod PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION is 
        protecting PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-SYMBOLS .
        protecting DEFINITION-PROTOCOL-RULES .
        protecting DEFINITION-CONSTRAINTS-INPUT .
        eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO = SS:StrandSet [nonexec] .
        eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL =  convert(SP:StrandData) [nonexec] .
        (V:VarDecls 
        convert([N:Nat |-> S:System] AT:AttackData))
    endfm) .

    rl [TranslationDataToMaudeNPANoAttacks] : 
        $translate [SP:StrandData] [SS:StrandSet] [$emptyAttackData]
        $varList(V:VarDecls)
    =>
    (fmod PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION is 
        protecting PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-SYMBOLS .
        protecting DEFINITION-PROTOCOL-RULES .
        protecting DEFINITION-CONSTRAINTS-INPUT .
        eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO = SS:StrandSet [nonexec] .
        eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL =  convert(SP:StrandData) [nonexec] .
        V:VarDecls
    endfm) .

endm

---(
This module handles protocol composition. Note that this module, and TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA
are NOT compatible. One or the other needs to be chosen for
rewriting in, depending on whether we're translating a standard PSL 
specification, or a composition. This decision will have to be made at the Python level.
---)
mod COMPOSITION is
    protecting COMPOSITION-SYNTAX .
    protecting PSL-SEMANTICS .

    ---(
    translate wraps a copy of the specification of each protocol being
    composed. Then, each specification is translated independently of 
    the others. Once the translation is complete, we wrap the translated 
    data in "translated" to mark that we're done.
    ---)
    eq $translate(N:Nat, Specification{$emptyProtocol $emptyIntruder $emptyAttacks} T:TranslationData) 
    = $translated(N:Nat, T:TranslationData) .


    vars RO1 RO2 : Role .
    vars N M P : Nat .
    vars IN1 IN2 OUT1 OUT2 : MsgSet .
    vars r1 r2 : FreshSet .
    vars L1 L2 : SMsgList-L .
    vars R1 R2 : SMsgList-R .
    vars T1 T2 : TranslationData .
    vars SD1 SD2 : StrandData .

    vars CHILDMSG PARENTMSG : Msg .

    op compose : How Role Role -> CompType . 

    vars L3 L4 : SMsgList-L .
    vars R3 R4 : SMsgList-R .

    ---One to one
    ---Note that if we're composing more than two protocols, it may be the
    ---case that a parent strand already exists, because it's the child of
    ---a previous composition. The child strand will always
    ---be created, however.
    ---(
        These rules don't handle the following case:
        P_1-init ;1 P_2-init
        P_1-init ;1 P2-resp
        which say that P_1 may compose with either P_2-init or P_2-resp, but
        only one at a time. 
        So, we need to distinguish between adding a second potential child, and 
        adding your first child.
    ---)
    crl $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
        $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
        [comp(N, M) |-> RO1 ;1 RO2 : M:Mappings .[P] C:Composition
         CM:CompList] 
        [SD:StrandData]
        =>
        [comp(N, M) |-> C:Composition CM:CompList]
        $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
        $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
        [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1, {RO1 -> RO2 ;; 1-1 ;; PARENTMSG} | R1] {OUT1} &
         RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [$concat({RO1 -> RO2 ;; 1-1 ;; CHILDMSG}, L2) | R2] {OUT2} &
         SD:StrandData]
    if not RO1 in SD:StrandData  /\                         
       (CHILDMSG, PARENTMSG) := $synchroMsgs(M:Mappings) .

    crl $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
        $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
        [comp(N, M) |-> RO1 ;1 RO2 : M:Mappings .[P] C:Composition
         CM:CompList] 
        [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L3 | R3] {OUT1} &
        SD:StrandData]
        =>
        [comp(N, M) |-> C:Composition CM:CompList]
        $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
        $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
        [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L3, {RO1 -> RO2 ;; 1-1 ;; PARENTMSG} | R3] {OUT1} &
         RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [$concat({RO1 -> RO2 ;; 1-1 ;; CHILDMSG}, L2) | R2] {OUT2} &
         SD:StrandData]
    if (CHILDMSG, PARENTMSG) := $synchroMsgs(M:Mappings) .

    ---One to many
    ---Initial generation of strands.
    crl $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
        $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
        [comp(N, M) |-> RO1 ;* RO2 : M:Mappings .[P] C:Composition
         CM:CompList] 
        [SD:StrandData]
    => $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
       $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
       [comp(N, M) |-> C:Composition CM:CompList]
       [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1, {RO1 -> ROLE ;; 1-* ;; PARENTMSG} | R1] {OUT1} &
        RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [$concat({RO1 -> RO2 ;; 1-* ;; CHILDMSG}, L2) | R2] {OUT2} &
       SD:StrandData]
    if (CHILDMSG, PARENTMSG) := $synchroMsgs(M:Mappings) /\
        not RO1 in SD:StrandData .

    ---This covers the case where one parent is connecting to multiple children.
    crl $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
        $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
        [comp(N, M) |-> RO1 ;* RO2 : M:Mappings .[P] C:Composition
         CM:CompList] 
        [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L3, S:Synchro | R3] {OUT1} &
        SD:StrandData]
    => $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
       $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
       [comp(N, M) |-> C:Composition CM:CompList]
       [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L3, S:Synchro | R1] {OUT1} &
        RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [$concat({RO1 -> RO2 ;; 1-* ;; CHILDMSG}, L2) | R2] {OUT2} &
       SD:StrandData]
    if CHILDMSG := $synchroMsgs(S:Synchro, M:Mappings) .

    ---This covers the case where a child from a previous composition is being
    ---used as a parent in the next composition.
    crl $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
        $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
        [comp(N, M) |-> RO1 ;* RO2 : M:Mappings .[P] C:Composition
         CM:CompList] 
        [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L3 | R3] {OUT1} &
        SD:StrandData]
    => $translated(N, [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L1 | R1]{OUT1} & SD1] T1)
       $translated(M, [RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [L2 | R2]{OUT2} & SD2] T2)
       [comp(N, M) |-> C:Composition CM:CompList]
       [RO1 |-> {IN1} :: r1 :: [L3, {RO1 -> ROLE ;; 1-* ;; PARENTMSG} | R1] {OUT1} &
        RO2 |-> {IN2} :: r2 :: [$concat({RO1 -> RO2 ;; 1-* ;; CHILDMSG}, L2) | R2] {OUT2} &
       SD:StrandData]
    if not $synchroIn(L3) /\
       (PARENTMSG, CHILDMSG) := $synchroMsgs(M:Mappings) .

    op _in_ : Role StrandData -> Bool .

    eq R:Role in R:Role |-> {IN1} S:Strand {OUT1} & SD:StrandData = true .
    eq R:Role in SD:StrandData = false [owise]. 

    op $synchroIn : SMsgList-L -> Bool .
    eq $synchroIn((L1, {R1:Role -> R2:Role ;; H:How ;; M:Msg})) = true  [print "Matching true L1:" L1] .
    eq $synchroIn(L1) = false [owise print "Matching false L1:" L1] .

    eq comp(N, M) |-> emptyComp CM:CompList = CM:CompList .

    ops $compTranslateAttacks $compositionDone : -> TranslationData .
    eq [$noCM] = $compTranslateAttacks .
    ----TODO: Implement translating the attacks.
    eq $compTranslateAttacks = $compositionDone .

    op _in_ : Role StrandData -> Bool .
    eq RO1 in RO1 |-> {IN:MsgSet} S:Strand {OUT:MsgSet} & SD:StrandData 
    = true .
    eq RO1 in SD:StrandData = false [owise] .

    op $concat : Synchro SMsgList-L -> SMsgList-L .
    eq $concat(S:Synchro, (R:SMsgList-L, M:SMsg)) = 
        $concat(S:Synchro, R:SMsgList-L), M:SMsg .
    eq $concat(S:Synchro, nil) = nil, S:Synchro .
  
    sort SynchroTuple .
    op ((_,_)) : Msg Msg -> SynchroTuple .
    ---Parent msg is derived from the second element in each mapping pair,
    ---child msg from the first.
    op $synchroMsgs : Mappings -> SynchroTuple .
    op $synchroMsgs : Mappings SynchroTuple -> SynchroTuple .
    vars MC MP : Msg .
    eq $synchroMsgs((MC |-> MP, M:Mappings)) = 
       $synchroMsgs(M:Mappings, (MC, MP)) .
    vars MCS MPS : Msg .
    eq $synchroMsgs((MC |-> MP, M:Mappings), (MCS, MPS)) = 
       $synchroMsgs(M:Mappings, (MCS $; MC, MPS $; MP)) . 
    eq $synchroMsgs(MC |-> MP, (MCS, MPS)) = (MCS $; MC, MPS $; MP) . 

    op $synchroMsgs : Synchro Mappings -> Msg .
    eq $synchroMsgs({R1:Role -> R2:Role ;; H:How ;; PARENTMSG:Msg $; MR1:Msg}, 
       (MR2:Msg |-> MR1:Msg, M:Mappings))
    =   
       $synchroMsgs({R1:Role -> R2:Role ;; H:How ;; PARENTMSG}, M:Mappings) $;
       MR2:Msg .
    eq $synchroMsgs({R1:Role -> R2:Role ;; H:How ;; MR1:Msg}, 
       (MR2:Msg |-> MR1:Msg, M:Mappings)) 
    =  MR2:Msg [owise] .
    eq $synchroMsgs({R1:Role -> R2:Role ;; H:How ;; MR1:Msg}, 
       (MR2:Msg |-> MR1:Msg)) 
    =  MR2:Msg [owise] .
    
        

endm

mod COMP-TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA is
    protecting COMPOSITION .
    protecting TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA-SYNTAX .
    protecting TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA-HELPER-FUNCTIONS-SEMANTICS .

    op $createModule : -> TranslationData .

    eq $compositionDone = [empty] $createModule .
    eq  [S:StrandSet] $translated(N:Nat, [S1:StrandSet] TD:TranslationData) = 
        [S:StrandSet & S1:StrandSet] .

    rl  $createModule
        [SD:StrandData] 
        [SS:StrandSet]
        [[N:Nat |-> S:System] A:AttackData]
    =>
    (fmod PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION is
        protecting PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-SYMBOLS .
        protecting DEFINITION-PROTOCOL-RULES .
        protecting DEFINITION-CONSTRAINTS-INPUT .
        eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO = SS:StrandSet [nonexec] .
        eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL = convert(SD:StrandData) [nonexec] .
        convert([N:Nat |-> S:System] A:AttackData)
    endfm) .

    rl   
        [SD:StrandData] 
        [$emptyAttackData]
        [SS:StrandSet]
    =>
    (fmod PROTOCOL-SPECIFICATION is
        protecting PROTOCOL-EXAMPLE-SYMBOLS .
        protecting DEFINITION-PROTOCOL-RULES .
        protecting DEFINITION-CONSTRAINTS-INPUT .
        eq STRANDS-DOLEVYAO = SS:StrandSet [nonexec] .
        eq STRANDS-PROTOCOL = convert(SD:StrandData) [nonexec] .
    endfm) [print SD:StrandData] .

endm


---red $makeIdem((AName:Msg |-> BName:Msg, BName:Msg |-> AName:Msg)) .
---Note: To successfully rewrite the PSL term, we need the following:
---[<DEFS>] - definitions. <DEFS> = $noDefs if we have no 
              ---definitions
---[mt] - Starting Strand data for protocols.
--- [empty] - Starting Strand Set for the Intruder.
--- {S:StrandSet} - A silly thing that ensures that a variable
                  ---S appears in the attack patterns.
---{K:IntruderKnowledge} - Another silly thing needed by the
                         ---attack patterns
---[mt] - Another strand data if we're rewriting a composition term (and ONLY
---         if we're rewriting a composition term). This should be included
---         at the top level (i.e. same level as the [comp] structure and 
---         the translate terms).
---Note: Make sure to have python select the correct module 
---[TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA or COMP-TRANSLATION-TO-MAUDE-NPA]