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joydeep
VerifyTESLA
Commits
4625b0ca
Commit
4625b0ca
authored
May 14, 2015
by
acholewa
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Moved ISO5.psl into the done_examples folder, and the Carlsen-SK.psl specification.
parent
c02a13db
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+100
-4
examples/done_examples/Carlsen-SK.psl
examples/done_examples/Carlsen-SK.psl
+96
-0
examples/done_examples/ISO5.psl
examples/done_examples/ISO5.psl
+4
-4
No files found.
examples/Carlsen-SK.psl
→
examples/
done_examples/
Carlsen-SK.psl
View file @
4625b0ca
spec Carlse-SK is
Theory
types Uname Sname
n
ame Key Nonce Masterkey Sessionkey .
types Uname Sname
N
ame Key Nonce Masterkey Sessionkey .
subtype Masterkey Sessionkey < Key .
subtype Sname Uname <
n
ame .
subtype
n
ame < Public .
subtype Sname Uname <
N
ame .
subtype
N
ame < Public .
op n :
n
ame Fresh -> Nonce .
op n :
N
ame Fresh -> Nonce .
ops a b i : -> Uname [ctor] .
op s : -> Sname [ctor] .
op mkey :
name n
ame -> Masterkey [comm] .
op seskey :
name n
ame Nonce -> Sessionkey .
op mkey :
Name N
ame -> Masterkey [comm] .
op seskey :
Name N
ame Nonce -> Sessionkey .
op e : Key Msg -> Msg .
op d : Key Msg -> Msg .
op _;_ : Msg Msg -> Msg [gather (e E)] .
var K : Key .
var Z : Msg .
eq d(K:Key, e (K:Key, Z:Msg )) = Z:Msg .
eq e(K:Key, d (K:Key, Z:Msg )) = Z:Msg .
...
...
@@ -25,35 +27,37 @@ Theory
A -> B : E(kab:nb')
*/
Protocol
vars A
B A1 A2 B
1 : Uname .
var S
S1 S2
: Sname .
vars A
NAME BNAME ANAME1 ANAME2 BNAME
1 : Uname .
var S
NAME
: Sname .
vars M N MA : Msg .
vars NA NA1 NB NB1 : Nonce .
var K : Key .
var SKA SKB : Sessionkey .
vars r r1 : Fresh .
vars r r1
r2
: Fresh .
Def(A) = na := n(A, r), kas := mkey(A, s) .
In(A) = A, B, S .
roles A B S .
Def(B) = nb := n(B, r), kbs := mkey(B, s), nb1 := n(B, r1) .
In(B) = B, S .
Def(A) = na := n(ANAME, r), kas := mkey(ANAME, s) .
Def(B) = nb := n(BNAME, r), kbs := mkey(BNAME, s),
nb1 := n(BNAME, r1) .
Def(S) = ns := n(SNAME, r2), kab := seskey(ANAME2, BNAME1, ns),
ksa := mkey(ANAME2, SNAME), ksb := mkey(BNAME1, SNAME) .
Def(S) = ns := n(s, r), kab := seskey(A, B, n(s,r)),
ksa := mkey(A2, s), ksb := mkey(B1, s) .
In(S) = S .
In(A) = ANAME, BNAME, SNAME .
In(B) = BNAME, SNAME .
In(S) = S
NAME
.
1 . A -> B : A ; na
|- A1 ; NA .
1 . A -> B : A
NAME
; na
|- A
NAME
1 ; NA .
2 . B -> S : A
1 ; NA ; B
; nb
|- A
2 ; NA1 ; B
1 ; NB .
2 . B -> S : A
NAME1 ; NA ; BNAME
; nb
|- A
NAME2 ; NA1 ; BNAME
1 ; NB .
3 . S -> B : e(ksb, kab
; NB ; A2) ; e(ksa, NA1 ; B
1 ; kab)
|- e(k
s, SKB ; nb ; A
) ; MA .
3 . S -> B : e(ksb, kab
; NB ; ANAME2) ; e(ksa, NA1 ; BNAME
1 ; kab)
|- e(k
bs, SKB ; nb ; ANAME1
) ; MA .
4 . B -> A : MA ; e(SKB, NA) ; nb1
|- e(kas, na ; B ; SKA) ; e(SKA, na) ; NB1 .
4 . B -> A : MA
; e(SKB, NA) ; nb1
|- e(kas, na ; B
NAME
; SKA) ; e(SKA, na) ; NB1 .
5 . A -> B : e(SKA, NB1)
|- e(SKB, nb1) .
...
...
@@ -63,36 +67,30 @@ Protocol
Out(S) = kab, NB, NA1 .
Intruder
vars A
B
: Uname .
vars A
NAME
: Uname .
var r : Fresh .
vars M N : Msg .
var K : Key .
=> A
, s, n(i, r), mkey(i, s), mkey(i, A
) .
=> A
NAME, s, mkey(i, s), mkey(i, ANAME
) .
K, M => d(K, M), e(K, M) .
M, N <=> M ; N .
Attacks
vars A B : Uname .
var S : Sname .
var SK : Sessionkey .
var NB1 : Nonce .
var r1 : Fresh .
0 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A
1 |-> a , B |-> b, S
|-> s .
Subst(B) = A
NAME1 |-> a , BNAME |-> b, SNAME
|-> s .
1 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A
1 |-> a, B |-> b, S
|-> s .
Intruder learns SK .
Subst(B) = A
NAME1 |-> a, BNAME |-> b, SNAME
|-> s .
Intruder learns SK
B
.
2 .
B executes protocol .
Subst(B) = A
1 |-> a, B |-> b, S
|-> s .
Subst(B) = A
NAME1 |-> a, BNAME |-> b, SNAME
|-> s .
without:
A executes protocol .
Subst(A) = A
|-> a, B |-> b, S
|-> s, NB1 |-> n(b, r1) .
Subst(A) = A
NAME |-> a, BNAME |-> b, SNAME
|-> s, NB1 |-> n(b, r1) .
ends
examples/ISO5.psl
→
examples/
done_examples/
ISO5.psl
View file @
4625b0ca
...
...
@@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ Protocol
roles A B S .
Def(A) = na := n(ANAME, r), kas := mkey(ANAME,
SNAME
) .
Def(A) = na := n(ANAME, r), kas := mkey(ANAME,
s
) .
In(A) = ANAME, BNAME, SNAME .
Def(B) = nb := n(BNAME, r), nb1 := n(BNAME, r'), kbs := mkey(BNAME,
SNAME
) .
Def(B) = nb := n(BNAME, r), nb1 := n(BNAME, r'), kbs := mkey(BNAME,
s
) .
In(B) = BNAME, SNAME .
Def(S) = ksa := mkey(AS,
SNAME), ksb := mkey(BS,SNAME
),
Def(S) = ksa := mkey(AS,
s), ksb := mkey(BS, s
),
kab := seskey(AS, BS, n(s,r)) .
In(S) = SNAME .
...
...
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ Intruder
vars M N : Msg .
var r : Fresh .
=> C, s, mkey(i, D), mkey(i, s)
, n(i, r)
.
=> C, s, mkey(i, D), mkey(i, s) .
K, M => d(K, M), e(K, M) .
M, N <=> M ; N .
...
...
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